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Abstract
Why do people help strangers when there is a low probability that help will be directly reciprocated or socially rewarded? A
possible explanation is that these acts are contagious: those who receive or observe help from a stranger become more
likely to help others. We test two mechanisms for the social contagion of generosity among strangers: generalized
reciprocity (a recipient of generosity is more likely to pay it forward) and third-party influence (an observer of generous
behavior is more likely to emulate it). We use an online experiment with randomized trials to test the two hypothesized
mechanisms and their interaction by manipulating the extent to which participants receive and observe help. Results show
that receiving help can increase the willingness to be generous towards others, but observing help can have the opposite
effect, especially among those who have not received help. These results suggest that observing widespread generosity
may attenuate the belief that one’s own efforts are needed.
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Introduction
‘‘In the order of nature we cannot render benefits to those from whom we
receive them, or only seldom. But the benefit we receive must be rendered again,
line for line, deed for deed, cent for cent, to somebody’’ – Ralph Waldo
Emerson.
‘‘…[W]hen you meet with another honest Man in similar Distress, you
must pay me by lending this Sum to him; enjoining him to discharge the Debt by
a like operation, when he shall be able, and shall meet with another
opportunity. I hope it may thus go thro’ many hands, before it meets with a
Knave that will stop its Progress.’’ – Benjamin Franklin, to a stranger
whom he had given money.
On a cold December morning in 2012, in the drive-through of
the Tim Hortons in Winnipeg, Canada, a stranger generously
picked up the tab for the coffee order of the next customer waiting
in line. That person paid the bill of the next stranger in line. And
so did the following 226 customers [1]. The practice of ‘‘paying it
forward’’ spread not only to other customers of the restaurant but
to other restaurants – the Chick-fil-A drive-through off Highway
46 in New Braunfels, Texas, a Dunkin’ Donuts drive-through in
Detroit, and a McDonald’s drive-through in Fargo, North Dakota
[2,3]. ‘‘Serial pay-it-forward incidents involving between 4 and 24
cars have been reported at Wendy’s, McDonald’s, Starbucks, Del
Taco, Taco Bell, KFC and Dunkin’ Donuts locations in
Maryland, Florida, California, Texas, Louisiana, Pennsylvania,
Oklahoma, Georgia, Alabama, North Dakota, Michigan, North
Carolina and Washington.’’
‘‘Pay it forward’’ is not limited to restaurant drive-ins. Acts of
generosity occur commonly in daily life, ranging from anonymous
blood donations to stopping to help a stranded motorist. In online
communities, voluntary contributions are pervasive: every day,
millions of people write restaurant reviews, leave product ratings,
provide answers to an unknown user’s question, or contribute lines
of code to open-source software, all without any direct reward or
recognition. Why, in the absence of external sanctions and
opportunities for reciprocation, do people help strangers?
One possible explanation is that helping is driven by receiving
or observing help. In other words, generosity towards strangers
may be socially contagious. In a ground-breaking study, Fowler
and Christakis [4] found evidence that generous behavior can
indeed ripple through social networks. In particular, the authors
showed that the ‘‘three degrees of influence’’ rule observed for
other contagions, such as the spread of happiness and obesity [5],
applies as well to generous behavior. If you help someone, you not
only increase the likelihood that they help others, but that those
they help will also help others, and so on, out to three steps. Using
similar experimental designs, Suri and Watts [6] and Jordan et al.
[7] also found that generous behavior was contagious, but that it
does not spread beyond the direct interaction.
The contagiousness of generosity may depend on the mecha-
nism by which it spreads. Fowler and Christakis [4] and Suri and
Watts [6] tested the spread of generosity on networks but their
studies were not designed to identify the underlying mechanisms.
They used a public goods experiment in which multiple
individuals donate to a common pool and then share the
investment equally. Contagion occurs when an individual who
has interacted with generous partners in one group donates more
in the next group. Although useful in demonstrating contagion, the
public-goods experimental design, including the N-person Prison-
er’s Dilemma [7,8], does not distinguish between receiving and
observing generosity since group members also benefit from the
generous acts they observe. The present research uses an
innovative experimental design to distinguish between the two
processes and to measure their contribution to the contagion of
generosity.
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Generalized Reciprocity and Third-Party Influence
Previous research suggests that there are two distinct mecha-
nisms for the social contagion of generosity among strangers:
generalized reciprocity (GR) and third-party influence (TPI).
Generalized reciprocity (GR) refers to cases in which those who
benefit from the kindness of strangers become more generous
towards others in the future. As diagramed in Figure 1, A helps B
because C has helped A [9,10]. Third-party influence (TPI) refers
to cases in which those who observe kindness between strangers
become more generous towards a stranger: A helps B because A
has observed C help D. GR characterizes ‘‘pay it forward’’
behavior triggered by normative or expressive responses to being
helped [11], while TPI characterizes social learning through
imitation of others’ behavior.
The difference in the two mechanisms parallels Deutsch and
Gerard’s [12] distinction between normative and informational
influence. GR is driven by an ‘‘injunctive norm’’ [13,14] – a
normative obligation to express one’s gratitude at being helped not
by repaying the helper but by acting as the helper acted. TPI is
driven by a ‘‘descriptive norm’’ – to follow the example of others’
behavior when unsure about how one is expected to act.
GR and TPI also differ in the pattern of transmission. GR
transmits the contagion from person to person through direct
contact and hence its contagious effect is limited to the one person
who was previously helped. In contrast, TPI has the potential to
broadcast the contagion from one person to any number of
observers. For example, when a stranger stops to help a stranded
motorist, only one person receives help but thousands of passersby
might observe helping behavior.
This multiplier effect of TPI means that we are far more likely
to observe generosity than to receive it. If widespread observation
establishes a descriptive norm that in turn makes each individual
more likely to be generous, then TPI could generate a powerful
self-reinforcing dynamic [15]. However, previous research on
threshold models of social contagion [16–19], the ‘‘free-rider’’
problem in collective action [20], social loafing in groups [21], the
Volunteer’s Dilemma [22], the ‘‘bystander effect,’’ and the
diffusion of responsibility [23] all point to a very different
possibility: that an individual is more likely to help or contribute
when confronted with the stark reality that ‘‘if you don’t do it,
nobody else will’’ [20]. Once a descriptive norm has been
established and people take for granted that someone else is likely
to help, one’s own contribution appears less essential. In short,
once the observed level of generosity is sufficient to safely assume
that one’s own contribution is not needed, the positive effect of the
descriptive norm can be expected to reverse, such that third-party
influence becomes negative (i.e. the observer does the opposite of
the observed behavior; see Figure 2).
Although conceptually distinct, GR and TPI are not proposed
as alternative explanations for the contagion of generosity among
strangers. Rather, the two mechanisms are likely to interact, due to
the greater likelihood to both receive and observe generosity from
strangers in populations where this behavior is normative. When
people observe helping behavior after previously receiving help
from a stranger, the normative influence from GR is expected to
mitigate the negative effects of observing widespread acts of
helping.
The present study aims to test GR and TPI as possible
mechanisms in the social contagion of generosity. This requires an
experimental design in which receiving and observing generosity
are not confounded by each other or by the effects of closely
related mechanisms. In particular, GR can be confounded by
indirect reciprocity and TPI by peer pressure, and both GR and
TPI may be confounded by unconditional generosity. In the
sections that follow, we elaborate the distinctions, both theoret-
ically and operationally.
Generalized Reciprocity vs. Indirect Reciprocity
Generalized reciprocity should not be confused with indirect
reciprocity. Both involve the pattern depicted in Figure 1 in which
A helps B and C helps A, but they differ in sequencing, and the
difference in temporal ordering implies different motivations. With
GR, C helps A before A helps B, while with indirect reciprocity, C
helps A after A helps B. GR is more plausibly motivated by
feelings of obligation and/or gratitude in response to receiving
help, while indirect reciprocity is generally assumed to be
instrumentally motivated as a reputational strategy for obtaining
help [11,24,25].
Generalized reciprocity also differs from generalized exchange
[26]. The latter refers to a pattern of exchange between two
members of a group, both of whom give and receive from a group
member but not necessarily one another. By that definition, both
GR and indirect reciprocity can be classified as two different forms
of generalized exchange.
Prosocial behavior could increase when reciprocity is general-
ized as well as when it is indirect, but only the former leads to
social contagion through transmission upon contact. With GR, the
helping behavior is backward-looking – a response to the helping
behavior of others. In contrast, when reciprocity is indirect, the
helping behavior is forward-looking, in anticipation of the receipt
of help. Indirect reciprocity could increase generous behavior
because it changes the interaction situation by modifying the
incentives. GR could increase generous behavior because gener-
osity generates more generosity. Unfortunately, observational
studies of generalized exchange cannot distinguish between GR
and indirect reciprocity. For example, the three best documented
cases of generalized exchange in naturally occurring environments
– the Kula trading ring among South Pacific islanders [27], the
kinship relations among aboriginal tribes [28], and the support
networks of low-income black women [29] – involve very small
communities, in which helping behavior could be motivated by
Figure 1. Two mechanisms for the contagion of generosity. (A)
Generalized reciprocity: A helps B because C has helped A. (B) Third-
party influence: A helps B because A has observed C help D. Arrows
indicate helping or giving, dashed lines indicate observing.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0087275.g001
Figure 2. Monotonic and non-monotonic changes in the
probability to help. Both (A) generalized reciprocity and (B) third-
party influence are expected to increase the probability to help (p)
above the baseline level of ‘‘unconditional generosity’’ (p0) but the
effects from repeatedly receiving and observing help are expected to
differ.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0087275.g002
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anticipated rewards rather than as a response to being helped.
Similarly, generalized-exchange experiments cannot distinguish
GR and indirect reciprocity if interactions are repeated in fixed
network structures and/or with full information about others’
behavior [30–33].
The effects of GR can be isolated from possible confounding
effects of indirect reciprocity by keeping interactions anonymous
and by preventing anyone else from knowing about an actor’s past
behavior. For example, [34] and [10] isolate GR from indirect
reciprocity by using anonymous one-shot interactions that remove
opportunities for reputation-based rewards.
Third-party Influence vs. Peer Pressure
Like GR, TPI can also be confused with other types of third-
party effects. The TPI we refer to corresponds to what Deutsch
and Gerard [12] call ‘‘informational influence,’’ in which an actor
models an observed behavior. Deutsch and Gerard distinguish this
from ‘‘normative influence,’’ in which an actor engages in a
behavior that is socially approved. When influence is normative,
one conforms to others’ behavior in order to be liked and
accepted. When influence is informational, the actor conforms to a
descriptive rather than prescriptive norm. For example, in
‘‘rational herding’’ [35], conformity occurs because one assumes
that others know better what the appropriate behavior should be.
The two types of influence are associated with different types of
social relationships. Normative social influence (or ‘‘peer pres-
sure’’) depends on the desire for social approval from significant
others, which in turn is likely to be greater when there is a pre-
existing and on-going social relationship, such as that between
family members, friends, or colleagues. In contrast, when
relationships are novel and/or transient, as when interacting with
strangers, dependence on cues from network neighbors may be
more important than dependence on social approval.
This distinction between normative and informational influence
is therefore important for the study of generosity among strangers.
Normative influence is more relevant for the enforcement of pro-
social behavior in tight-knit social groups whose members depend
on one another for social approval, while informational influence
is more relevant for the contagion of generosity among strangers.
Most previous studies of social contagion have been observations
of cascades passing through pre-existing social relationships
between people who already knew one another [5,36]. These
situations are not well-suited for the study of informational
influence, which is likely to be obscured and confounded by
normative pressures. The effects of informational influence can be
isolated from possible confounding effects of peer pressure by
keeping all actors anonymous and precluding repeated local
interactions. For example, Salganik, Dodds, and Watts [37]
succeed in detecting informational influence in a cultural market
by letting participants interact a single time and by revealing to
them only the aggregated behavior of others.
Unconditional Generosity as Baseline
In addition to distinguishing GR from indirect reciprocity and
TPI from normative influence, it is crucial to also distinguish both
GR and TPI from another important and possibly confounding
mechanism – unconditional generosity. Unlike GR and TPI,
unconditional generosity occurs when A helps B even though A
has not received help from C nor observed C helping D. Thus,
when A helps B after receiving help from C, it is possible that A
would have helped B anyway. This possibility was overlooked by
two previous studies of GR [10,34]. These studies offer evidence
that individuals who have been recent recipients of generosity are
likely to be similarly generous to a third party, even if they know
that they cannot benefit from this in the future. However, it is
unclear whether participants would have made a similar donation
even if they had not received a donation from a stranger. In other
words, the observed generosity could have been due to uncondi-
tional generosity, rather than the result of contagion through GR.
The effects of GR and TPI can be isolated from possible
confounding effects of unconditional generosity by measuring the
effect of receiving and observing generosity above and beyond a
baseline tendency to help under an otherwise identical decision
situation but in which help is neither received nor observed.
Similarly, the effects of GR can be isolated from TPI by measuring
the effect of receiving help among those who are unable to observe
helping behavior more generally. These conditions rarely obtain in
natural settings, which limits the ability to identify the underlying
mechanisms in observational studies of helping behavior. We
therefore designed and conducted an experiment with human
participants.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
The research was approved by the Institutional Review Board
for Human Participants of Cornell University. Written informed
consent was obtained from all subjects.
Procedure
Subjects were recruited from and paid through the online
crowdsourcing platform Amazon Mechanical Turk [38–42] but
interacted on a website hosted on our webserver. The study was
designed as a sequential two-player investment/gift-exchange
game in groups of 150 with random partner selection. In the
game, a participant could choose to return part of their payment
so that another anonymous participant could benefit (similarly to
[10] and [31]).
The study was conducted in March–April, 2013. We first
recruited a pool of potential participants by posting a task on the
online crowdsourcing platform Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT).
The task was called ‘‘Sign up to participate in the Invitation
Game’’ and paid $0.20 when submitted. The task invited AMT
users to sign up for a study that offered the chance to earn up to
$14–21 for doing the same $2–3 ten-minute task multiple times.
To sign up, an AMT user simply needed to read and agree to the
terms of the study and provide standard demographic information
(gender, age, ethnicity, nationality, education, religious affiliation,
and income). The instructions emphasized that the demographic
information would not be used for selecting the participants. The
AMT users were informed that they could only participate in the
task and earn the promised amount if they were randomly selected
from the pool of potential participants. Participants were eligible to
be selected multiple times but there was no guarantee that they
would be selected even once. If selected, the participant was to
receive an e-mail notification with further instructions. (See the
recruitment instructions in Experiment Instructions S1.).
The email invitation informed recipients that they were
randomly chosen to participate in the Invitation Game, which
they had to complete within 24 hours. Participants were given
their AMT worker ID and a unique randomly generated
Invitation ID to log into our website. On the website, participants
read a description of the Invitation Game, answered five multiple-
choice questions testing their understanding of the game rules,
wrote a short summary of the decision situation they were facing,
and made a single decision about whether to donate money to
benefit a stranger (see Experiment Instructions S1).
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The game description explained to each participant that they
would be paid the amount promised in the original solicitation,
which included a ‘‘base’’ payment plus a ‘‘bonus’’ payment.
Participants were also told that they were part of a group of 150
AMT users and that only members of this group who received an
invitation could actually participate and receive the promised
payment. The instructions further informed participants that the
study had allocated a limited number of invitations to be
distributed to randomly selected participants, whom we will here
call ‘‘seeds.’’ The seeds were invited to participate by the
experimenters. In addition to these invitations created by the
experimenters, each participant who received and accepted an
invitation had the option to create a new invitation and allow one
more person than otherwise to participate. However, in order to
create a new invitation, the participant had to be willing to donate
his or her bonus, even though this would reduce the participant’s
earnings which would then be limited to just the base payment. If
the participant chose to donate his or her bonus, a recipient of the
new invitation (called ‘‘invitee’’) would then be randomly selected
from the other 149 AMT users in the group. The instructions
explained further that when a participant donated his or her
bonus, we supplemented the bonus amount so that the next invited
participant received the same base payment and bonus and had
the same options: to keep his or her bonus or donate it and create
a new invitation for one more participant.
The instructions were identical for seeds and invitees, with one
exception. Unlike those invited by the experimenters (i.e. the
seeds), the recipients of participant-generated invitations (i.e. the
invitees) were informed that they were given the opportunity to
complete the task because another participant had donated his or
her bonus (referred to hereafter as ‘‘donated invitations’’). This
one sentence is the only difference in the treatment received by
seeds and invitees and provides a very conservative test of the
effects of receiving and observing help, given that participants in
both treatment conditions received invitations, with the only
difference being the source of the invitation and no difference in
the size of the bonus that accompanied the invitation. Information
is all that was manipulated; there was no difference in the amount
of money received.
All participants knew that the person who receives the donated
invitation would not know the identity of the participant who
made the donation. Thus, anyone receiving a donated invitation
was unable to directly reciprocate or to pass along a favorable
reputation. We referred to participants by their AMT worker ID,
randomly anonymized in a way that precluded the possibility to
identify the same individual and be influenced by reputation. We
used anonymized identifiers to refer to the other participants in
order to dispel any suspicion of deception and to make the
information more prominent and compelling. (The detailed
instructions used in the study are included in Experiment
Instructions S1.).
Treatments
The experiment involved five manipulations:
N Whether the participant received a donated invitation created
by another participant. Some participants were only selected
as seeds while others were only selected as invitees. Still other
participants were selected as invitees after having been
previously selected as seeds. (Previous invitees were ineligible
to be selected as seeds since this violated the concept of a seed
as the first mover in a sequential decision process.) Invitees
were explicitly informed that they were given the opportunity
to complete the task because another participant had donated
his or her bonus and created the invitation they received.
N The number of times the participant was invited to play the
game, either as a seed or invitee. Participants were randomly
selected to take part in the game (as a seed or invitee) between
one and six times.
N Whether the participant was able to observe donated
invitations. In the observation condition, both seeds and
invitees were informed about the number of donated
invitations that had been created by other participants in
their group up to that point in time and saw a list of the pairs of
givers and recipients. Participants were permanently assigned
to either the observation or no-observation condition;
otherwise the effects of observation would carry over to affect
behavior in the no-observation condition as well.
N The number of donated invitations the participant observed.
Participants in the observation condition were randomly
selected to observe different numbers of invitations donated
by the members of their group, ranging from zero to 223
observed invitations. Since the number of invitations created
by other participants could stay the same or increase, a
participant who interacted multiple times in the observation
treatment could observe only a higher number of donated
invitations in subsequent interactions. Participants could see
the total number of donated invitations as well as a list of
donors and invitees (with the AMT worker IDs modified to
preserve anonymity). Alternatively, we could have displayed
the number of members who had chosen to donate, but this
would understate members’ level of effort since it would not
reflect multiple donations.
N The payment the participant received. Previous research on
prosocial behavior has shown that the willingness to donate
depends in part on the resources that are available [20]. We
manipulated the payment in order to measure the robustness
of the results across different incentives to return the bonus. In
the high payment treatment, participants received $2 base rate
and $1 bonus and in the low payment treatment, they received
$1 base rate and $1 bonus. Participants were permanently
assigned to either the high or low payment condition.
The two between-individual manipulations, observation: yes/no
and payment: high/low were crossed to define four between-
individual treatment groups to which participants were randomly
assigned. The number of invitations received and observed varied
within individual. The number of seeds and invitees varied across
treatment groups due to differences across treatments in the rate at
which participants were willing to donate (Table S1 in Materials
and Methods S1).
Results
A total of 573 AMT users participated in the experiment, with a
mean number of interactions of 2.1 (ranging from 1 to 6), for a
total of 1,196 observations. For the analyses, we removed data
from 55 participants (126 observations) who required more than
five attempts to answer the five multiple-choice questions correctly
or whose written summaries revealed an apparent lack of
understanding of the instructions. (The results do not change
qualitatively if we include participants who required fewer
attempts to correctly answer the questions. The results are also
qualitatively similar if we use all observations. See Table S2 in
Materials and Methods S1.) This left 518 individuals and 1,070
observations, with between 1 and 6 observations per individual
(mean of 2.1 and median of 2 observations).
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Participants had a mean age of 30.0 (ranging from 17 to 70;
Amazon does not allow minors to create and maintain AMT
accounts, so the two individuals who reported age under 18 must
have either reported incorrect information or used an adult’s
AMT account), were 38.8% female, with a median household
income of $40,000–49,999. The sample consisted of 91.3% US
citizens and 6.0% Indian citizens, the remaining being from other
countries. The most common ethnicities were 72.2% White and
13.7% Asian. 29.3% reported being non-religious and 25.5%
atheists, while Christianity was the most common religion (10.4%
Protestant, 9.9% Roman Catholic, and 12.4% other Christian).
12.9% reported educational attainment of high school or less,
42.3% some college or Associate’s degree, 35.5% Bachelor’s
degree, and 9.3% graduate degree. (For detailed demographics of
the sample, see Table S3 in Materials and Methods S1.).
In 68.1% of all interactions, participants chose to donate their
bonus and thereby create an invitation for a stranger at personal
expense (62.0% in the low-payment condition and 74.1% in the
high-payment condition). Subjects were also relatively consistent in
their behavior – out of the 327 individuals who interacted more
than once, only 47 varied their decision.
We used random-intercepts logistic regression models of
observations nested in individuals to estimate the change in the
odds of donating under the different manipulations. The models
allow us to adjust for the non-independence of repeated measures
and control for the effect of payment level and two other potential
confounders – the time elapsed between subsequent interactions
and the number of previous interactions, both of which differed
between seeds and invitees since invitees on average interacted
with greater frequency compared to seeds. To better isolate the
mechanisms, the models pool data only form the relevant
treatment conditions: we test GR in the no-observation condition
only, we test TPI for seeds only, and we test the interaction of GR
and TPI in the observation condition only. We report odds ratios
which have a more intuitive interpretation than logistic coeffi-
cients. It is important to note that the baseline condition in which
participants neither receive nor observe donated invitations does
not completely isolate unconditional generosity as a mechanism
because returning one’s bonus and creating an invitation slightly
increases one’s chance to be invited again and hence, could be
strategically motivated. Future research could address this possible
confound by manipulating group size, but the focus in the present
study is on isolating the effects of GR and TPI, which are not
confounded by strategic motivation since the possibility to be re-
invited is exactly the same for seeds and invitees.
We tested GR by manipulating whether participants in the no-
observation condition were seeds or invitees (H1.1) and also the
number of donated invitations they received (H1.2). Few
participants received more than two invitations; hence we binned
these as two or more. The results are limited to the no-observation
condition (N=516) to avoid confounding the effects of receiving
and observing invitations (since the more invitations that other
participants have previously sent, the higher the number of
invitations that can be observed as well as received).
Consistent with GR, Table 1A reveals a seven-fold increase in
the odds of donating (p=0.030) among invitees compared to the
baseline odds for seeds. Although statistically significant, the
change in behavior was relatively small, as evident in Figure 3,
which reports the change in the fraction donating (rather than the
odds), and only within individuals (Table S5 in Materials and
Methods S1). This small effect size may reflect the minimal GR
stimulus, which consisted of a single short statement informing
invitees that their invitation was created by another participant
who had donated his or her bonus to make that possible.
In sum, participants were more likely to be generous towards a
stranger after experiencing generosity. However, the effect is
limited to the first receipt of generosity as the critical event in
triggering GR. The odds of donating do not continue to increase
but instead slightly decrease with receiving additional donated
invitations. A plausible explanation is that participants may feel
they fulfilled their normative obligation to ‘‘pay it forward’’ when
they donated their bonus after their first donated invitation.
We tested TPI by manipulating whether participants observed
invitations created by others and the number of donated
invitations they observed. Due to the sparsity of data with 223
levels of observed donation and 266 participants, we binned the
number of observed donated invitations into three levels: 0–75 (up
to about one-third the total number of donations), 76–150
(between one-third and two-thirds), and 151+ (more than two-
thirds). Consistent with the expected effects of TPI, Table 1B and
Figure 4 show a statistically significant increase in the odds of
donating (OR=11.41, p = 0.043) among the seeds who had
observed between 0 and 75 donated invitations, compared to those
who had not observed any. However, the level of donation among
those who observed more than 75 invitations was not significantly
greater than the baseline level.
This is also consistent with the results for a model that directly
tests for changes in the level of donation among seeds as the
number of observed donations increases (reported in Table 1C).
Here the baseline is lowest level of observed donation instead of
the no-observation condition. Although the direction of the effect
is as predicted, the decrease in the probability of donation as the
number of observed donations increases is not statistically
significant (OR=0.047, p = 0.215 for observing 76–150;
OR=0.003, p=0.198 for observing 151+; x2 (1 df) = 1.08,
p=0.298 for the difference between observing 76–150 and
observing 151+). Similarly to GR, the effect of TPI appears to
be non-linear, with most of the effect evident at relatively low
levels of observed donation and little subsequent change. The
conclusion does not change with more fine-grained categories.
The rate of donation decreases (albeit not significantly) as the
number of observed donations increases from 0–25 to 26–50 to
51–75.
However, as the theory of GR suggests, the effect from
observing widespread generosity is significantly different for those
who have recently benefited from generosity compared to those
who have not. When observing more than 75 donated invitations,
the odds of donating decrease for seeds but do not change for
invitees (Table 1D and Figure 5). This difference in the odds-ratios
between seeds and invitees is statistically significant (x2 (1
df) = 3.88, p=0.049 for observing 76–150; x2 (1 df) = 5.55,
p=0.019 for observing 151+) and suggests the possibility that
seeds eventually succumb to a ‘‘bystander’’ (or ‘‘free-rider’’) effect
from which invitees are immune due to having been recipients of
generosity. This apparent immunity suggests that an injunctive
norm to ‘‘pay it forward’’ does not diminish when the level of
helping behavior is high, while a descriptive norm to ‘‘be generous
if that is what others are doing’’ is less resistant to the temptation to
‘‘let George do it’’ as the opportunity to do so increases.
Finally, our analyses also show that the odds of donating are
larger in the high-payment condition, especially among seeds in
the no-observation condition, as shown in Table 1A. Nevertheless,
the effects of GR and TPI do not significantly vary by payment
(Table S6 and Table S7 in Materials and Methods S1). There was
no significant change in the odds of donating with the wait time
between invitations or with the number of times one has previously
interacted. (We also tested the effect of demographic variables on
the odds of donating and apart from a positive effect from age,
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demographics do not affect generosity, as reported in Table S4 in
Materials and Methods S1.).
Discussion
Social contagion offers a compelling theoretical explanation for
the emergence and spread of generous behavior, especially when
directed towards strangers or in large groups where there is a very
low probability that generosity will be directly reciprocated. This
study investigated two mechanisms that might explain the
contagion of generosity – generalized reciprocity and third-party
influence. Causal mechanisms are notoriously difficult to observe
in natural settings, and controlled diffusion experiments with large
groups are highly impractical in traditional laboratory settings. We
therefore designed and conducted a large behavioral experiment
online. The experiment used anonymity to isolate the effects of the
contagion mechanisms from other cooperation-inducing mecha-
nisms, including direct and indirect reciprocity, as well as peer
pressure based on reputation effects. The experiment disentangled
the effects of receiving and observing generous behavior by
manipulating whether participants benefited from the willingness
of others to donate their bonus payment, the number of times they
benefited, whether participants were informed of the extent of
third party donations, and the number of donations they observed.
To ensure the robustness of the results across different incentive
levels, we also manipulated participants’ payments.
The experimental results show that receiving and observing
generosity can significantly increase the likelihood to be generous
towards a stranger. However, the results are also consistent with
the ‘‘bystander’’ hypothesis that the willingness to contribute can
be offset by lower perceived need when the level of helping is
sufficiently high. This bystander effect is especially evident among
Table 1. Odds Ratios for Donating Across Treatments.
Manipulation A) GR B) TPI+ C) TPI– D) GR6TPI
Invitee (receives a donated invitation) 7.006* 0.327
(0.030) (0.262)
Has previously received donated invitations 0.712 1.021
(0.686) (0.982)
Seeds
Observes 0–75 11.414* (baseline) (baseline)
(0.043)
Observes 76–150 1.341 0.047 0.136
(0.787) (0.215) (0.101)
Observes 151+ 0.219 0.003 0.015*
(0.280) (0.198) (0.022)
Invitees
Observes 0–75 (baseline)
Observes 76–150 19.907*
(0.041)
Observes 151+ 89.948*
(0.026)
High payment 64.103** 2.532 0.858 3.235
(0.007) (0.300) (0.930) (0.295)
Time waited (in hours) 0.972* 0.992 1.019 0.976
(0.023) (0.577) (0.619) (0.075)
Previous participations 0.690 0.784 1.347 0.454
(0.379) (0.622) (0.848) (0.171)
Baseline odds 4.305 5.323 152.785 268.707***
(0.181) (0.100) (0.130) (0.000)
Number of observations 516 371 175 554
Number of participants 252 277 133 266
x2Wald 5 df, 11.93* 6 df, 6.66 5 df, 2.49 8 df, 11.98
(0.036) (0.354) (0.778) (0.214)
Two-sided tests: *p,0.05, **p,0.01, ***p,0.001.
The table reports odds ratios and p values (in brackets) from random-intercept logistic regression models for A) seeds and invitees in the no-observation treatment by
number of donated invitations received; B) seeds in the observation and no-observation treatments by number of donated invitations observed; C) seeds in the
observation treatment by number of donated invitations observed; and D) seeds and invitees in the observation treatment by number of donated invitations observed
by invitees compared to seeds. Results show that receiving and observing donations initially increases the willingness to help others, and that invitees are less
susceptible to a subsequent decline in helping.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0087275.t001
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those who have not themselves benefited from generosity,
suggesting an important difference between injunctive and
descriptive norms: once the level of generosity is sufficient to
establish a descriptive norm to be generous towards others, further
increases in the level of generosity do not strengthen the norm but
instead signal that one’s own contribution is not needed. However,
an injunctive norm to reciprocate generosity by ‘‘paying it
forward’’ does not appear to depend on the belief that one’s
own contribution is needed. Framed by Cialdini’s extensive
research [14], it seems that the need for help alone is not sufficient
to motivate generous behavior unless coupled with either an
injunctive or descriptive norm, and norms are not sufficient unless
coupled with the need for help, especially if the norm is
descriptive.
The study contributes to knowledge about prosocial behavior,
altruism, and reciprocity by adopting a relational perspective in a
research line that has generally focused on individuals responding
independently or in aggregates but rarely as nodes of a social
network. We also contribute to knowledge about social contagion
by investigating the interaction between transmission through
direct contact and transmission through third-party influence, two
mechanisms that have been usually studied independently in
previous contagion research. We advance social science method-
ology by developing, demonstrating, and evaluating an online
platform for studying the diffusion of behavior in large social
groups under controlled conditions, something that is not feasible
in a traditional laboratory setting.
In addition to a greater insight into the theoretical puzzle of
generosity toward strangers (in the absence of clear opportunities
for personal gain), the possibility that generous behavior can
trigger cascades has important practical applications, including
fund-raising efforts for public broadcasting, contributions to online
collaborative projects, and creative participation in online content
communities. Our empirical findings could inform strategies for
more effectively targeting and structuring interventions intended
to promote pro-social behavior, generosity, and cooperative
ventures in large groups and organizations, with potential use by
philanthropists, activists, policy makers, managers, and adminis-
trators.
However, it is important to note that although GR and TPI
Figure 3. The effect of generalized reciprocity on the
willingness to donate in the no-observation condition. To
facilitate interpretation of the odds ratios, the figure shows the
estimated donation rate and 95% confidence intervals based on a
random-intercept linear regression model with robust standard errors
corresponding to the random-intercept logistic model in Table 1A. The
robust standard errors adjust for possible heteroskedasticity with a
binary dependent measure. The dashed line shows the baseline
donation rate among seeds in the no-observation condition. The
donation rate is significantly higher among invitees than among seeds
after receiving one donated invitation but does not continue to
increase with receipt of additional invitations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0087275.g003
Figure 4. The effect of third-party influence on the willingness
to donate among seeds. To facilitate interpretation of the odds
ratios, the figure shows the estimated donation rate and 95%
confidence intervals based on a random-intercept linear regression
model with robust standard errors corresponding to the random-
intercept logistic model in Table 1B. The robust standard errors adjust
for possible heteroskedasticity with a binary dependent measure. The
dashed line shows the baseline donation rate among seeds in the no-
observation condition. The donation rate is significantly higher after
observing 0–75 donations by other group members but then declines
as the level of observed donation increases further. However, the
decline is within the confidence intervals of the estimated donation
rates, consistent with the results in Table 1C (in which the donation
rates are compared across levels of observed donation).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0087275.g004
Figure 5. The effect of third-party influence on the willingness
to donate among seeds and invitees. To facilitate interpretation of
the odds ratios, the figure shows the estimated donation rate and 95%
confidence intervals based on a random-intercept linear regression
model with robust standard errors corresponding to the random-
intercept logistic model in Table 1D. The robust standard errors adjust
for possible heteroskedasticity with a binary dependent measure.
Relative to the 0–75 baseline, the donation rate declines with the level
of observed donation among seeds but not among invitees.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0087275.g005
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may be able to increase the level of generosity in a community,
they may not be sufficient to jump start the emergence of
cooperation. In particular, GR has been shown to be unstable as a
strategy for the evolution of cooperation [43]. Rather, GR is a
behavioral pattern that coevolved with cooperation mechanisms
such as direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, group selection, and
spatial structure [25,44].
Although the experimental design helps disentangle the effects
of GR and TPI, a word of caution is in order. While the AMT
participants are much more diverse than the college students used
in most previous experiments on prosocial behavior, the sample is
nevertheless not perfectly representative of the general population.
Future research should replicate the study with other populations
with different demographic profiles in order to test whether the
findings can be generalized to other populations. Ideally, the
external validity of the study should be confirmed in a field
experiment with stronger manipulations and more meaningful
donations. Such field experiment will be also better suited than the
online experiment we conducted to gauge the size of the GR and
TPI effects and the practicality of possible interventions. Future
research could also extend the present study by testing whether
egoistic behavior (e.g. stealing or free-riding) can also spread as an
‘‘anti-social’’ contagion, through influence (TPI) or ‘‘generalized
retaliation’’ (GR). The online experimental platform that we
developed for the current project can be improved and easily
adapted to study other populations, with different stimuli, and with
participants embedded in large social networks.
Another promising direction for further research is to investigate
the macro-level effects of GR and TPI. The effects of GR are
limited to the one person who is helped, while the effects of TPI
can extend to large numbers of people who observe helping
behavior. Thus, TPI may be vital in the early stages of a
contagion, by multiplying the number of cascades, while GR could
be more beneficial in the later stages, by reinforcing a widely held
descriptive norm with an emergent injunctive norm. This
reinforcement may be essential in offsetting the growing belief
that one’s own efforts are not needed as more people are observed
to help others. Moreover, these dynamics may depend as well on
the structure of social networks that limit the horizons for the
observation of helping behavior. The implications of network
structure for the dynamics of helping cascades driven by GR and
TPI are not intuitively obvious, and we expect agent-based models
may prove helpful in generating new hypotheses that can then be
tested in a new line of research using online experiments.
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